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A MEDICAL MONITORING CLAIM FOR ASYMPTOMATIC
PLAINTIFFS: SHOULD ILLINOIS TAKE THE PLUNGE?
By Herbert L. Zarov, Sheila Finnegan, Craig A. Woods, and Stephen J
Kane
1
Assume the following hypothetical: Acme Corporation sells a popular
prescription drug called Generic for five years before pulling Generic
from the market after studies link the drug with various types of cancer.
Thousands of former Generic users sue Acme, alleging claims for
"medical monitoring." The plaintiffs concede that they have not
incurred a physical injury. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs allege that their
use of Generic places them at an increased risk of contracting cancer.
As a result, the plaintiffs demand that Acme fund a program providing
annual medical examinations to screen for the types of cancer that
Generic allegedly causes.
The lawsuits against Acme raise a threshold legal question: may
plaintiffs who have not incurred physical injuries nevertheless state a
claim for medical monitoring? Beginning in the mid-1980s, a number
of courts faced with toxic tort and other claims brought by
asymptomatic plaintiffs answered "yes" and in the process abandoned
the longstanding requirement that plaintiffs prove a physical injury to
recover in tort. It is not difficult to understand why some courts
abandoned the physical injury requirement. Individuals exposed to
harmful substances that increase their risk of disease make sympathetic
plaintiffs. What's more, the conventional wisdom that medical
monitoring offers patients an unmitigated benefit has undoubtedly
motivated courts to provide that purported benefit to asymptomatic
plaintiffs.
In 1997, however, the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley2 called into
question the viability of medical monitoring claims by squarely
rejecting the claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The
Buckley Court recognized that notwithstanding the reasons that led
some courts to adopt medical monitoring claims, a number of
countervailing considerations counsel against abandoning the physical
injury requirement. The Court noted, for example, that because of the
ubiquity of harmful substances in modem society, virtually everyone is
a potential member of multiple medical monitoring classes. The
Herb, Sheila, Craig, and Steve are partners at Mayer Brown LLP.
2 Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
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ensuing flood of litigation would, among other things, diminish
defendants' ability to compensate those who later incur actual injuries,
require courts to expend resources on administering medical
monitoring programs at the expense of more pressing cases, and reduce
the availability of scarce medical resources. Moreover, the medical
community has rejected the conventional wisdom that medical
monitoring provides an unmitigated benefit to asymptomatic patients
and, in any event, insurance covers the cost of medically necessary
monitoring for the vast majority of Americans.
Relying on these public policy considerations, most courts
addressing the issue since Buckley have rejected claims for medical
monitoring absent physical injury. Nevertheless, a few courts have
issued post-Buckley decisions adopting claims for medical monitoring,
while other courts have continued to implement pre-Buckley decisions.
Thus, although there is a clear trend against the recognition of medical
monitoring claims, the debate is far from over.
This article argues that the Illinois Supreme Court should align
itself with the growing majority of post-Buckley decisions by rejecting
a claim or remedy for medical monitoring absent proof of a present
physical injury. We focus on Illinois because although an Illinois
intermediate appellate court has adopted a medical monitoring remedy
for asymptomatic plaintiffs, 3 the Illinois Supreme Court has not yet
addressed the issue. Furthermore, because Illinois has been a magnet
for the plaintiffs' bar-with Illinois counties until recently holding the
dubious distinction of being named three of the top six "Judicial
Hellholes" in the country4 _a decision from the Illinois Supreme Court
approving of medical monitoring could open the floodgates to claims
from the uninjured. Notwithstanding our focus on Illinois, however, the
arguments that we set forth below should be generally applicable across
the country.
In Section I, we outline the origins of medical monitoring
claims and describe the recent trend of decisions rejecting such claims
for asymptomatic plaintiffs. Section II discusses Illinois cases that have
addressed requests for medical monitoring. In Section III, we argue that
recognition of a claim for medical monitoring would revolutionize
Illinois law by abandoning the requirement that plaintiffs prove a
present physical injury. Section IV contends that the public policy
considerations at issue weigh heavily against the recognition of a
3 Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 871 (111. App. Ct. 2003).
4 American Tort Reform Foundation, Judicial Hellholes, 2006, at 18.
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medical monitoring claim for asymptomatic plaintiffs. Finally, Section
V argues that even if adoption of a medical monitoring claim were
warranted, the Illinois General Assembly is far better suited than the
judiciary to devise and administer such a claim.
I. FROM FRIENDS FOR ALL CHILDREN TO HENRY: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF CLAIMS FOR MEDICAL
MONITORING ABSENT PHYSICAL INJURY.
Courts and commentators generally trace the origins of medical
monitoring claims to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Friends For All
Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.5 Friends For All Children
arose out of an airplane crash that killed about half of the 301
passengers on board, most of whom were Vietnamese orphans. A
public interest organization suing on behalf of the surviving orphans
alleged that Lockheed negligently manufactured the airplane involved
in the accident. The plaintiff claimed that the crash placed the surviving
orphans at an increased risk of suffering a neurological development
disorder called Minimal Brain Dysfunction ("MBD"). As a result, the
plaintiff sought, among other things, the cost of diagnostic
examinations for the forty surviving orphans who resided in countries
that did not provide the examinations for free.
6
The district court concluded that MBD "can be adequately
treated and the disabling symptoms minimized only if identified early
in life, and before the onset of adolescence.",7 Indeed, the parties'
experts agreed "that most if not all these children should receive a
comprehensive set of diagnostic examinations to identify their
maladies, if any, and to determine appropriate treatment.",8 Therefore,
the district court ordered Lockheed to create a $450,000 fund to
reimburse the cost of diagnostic examinations. The court also
established a panel of medical experts to decide which, if any,
additional diagnostic tests should be provided. 9
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting Lockheed's argument that
the district court had erred by recognizing "a cause of action for
recompense for diagnostic examinations designed to discover whether
5 Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir.
1984).6 1d. at 819, 822.
7Id. at 822.
8 Id. at 825.
9Id. at 823.
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an individual has been injured."'10 In doing so, the court posed the
following hypothetical:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is
riding through a red light. Jones lands on his head with
some force. Understandably shaken, Jones enters a hospital
where doctors recommend that he undergo a battery of tests
to determine whether he has suffered any internal head
injuries. The tests prove negative, but Jones sues Smith for
what turns out to be the substantial cost of the diagnostic
examinations. 
1
The D.C. Circuit concluded that "even in the absence of physical injury
Jones ought to be able to recover the cost for the various diagnostic
examinations proximately caused by Smith's negligent action." 12 The
court provided two reasons for its conclusion. First, "[a] cause of action
allowing recovery for the expense of diagnostic examinations
recommended by competent physicians will, in theory, deter
misconduct., 1 3 Second, recognition of a medical monitoring claim
"accords with commonly shared intuitions of normative justice which
underlie the common law of tort. The motorbike rider, through his own
negligence, caused the plaintiff, in the opinion of medical experts, to
need specific medical services-a cost that is neither inconsequential
nor of a kind the community generally accepts as part of the wear and
tear of daily life."1 4 Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the
court concluded that Lockheed "should make the [orphans] whole by
paying for the examinations."
1 5
The facts presented in Friends For All Children are
significantly different from those in typical medical monitoring cases.
First, as the Supreme Court recognized in Buckley, Friends For All
Children involved "special recovery-permitting circumstances"-i.e.,
"the presence of a traumatic physical impact." 16 The Buckley Court
pointed out that cases involving traumatic physical impact are "beside
the point" in the typical medical monitoring case, where plaintiffs seek
monitoring to detect far more speculative injuries resulting from
10 Id. at 824.
i1Id. at 825.12 1d.
13 id.
14 1d.
1 Id. at 826.
16 Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 440 (1997).
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exposure to harmful substances. 17 Indeed, in a subsequent lawsuit
against a tobacco manufacturer, a court applying District of Columbia
law did not even cite Friends For All Children in holding that "medical
monitoring requires that the plaintiff have a present injury."' 8 Second,
Friends For All Children did not provide the crash's survivors with
annual medical examinations of the sort typically requested in medical
monitoring cases. Rather, the D.C. Circuit authorized one-time
diagnostic examinations and established a panel of experts to determine
the need for further testing. Of course, "ongoing 'medical surveillance'
in a toxic tort case is a far broader remedy than one time only
diagnostic examinations necessitated by a single traumatic event.
'19
Third, Friends For All Children limited the medical monitoring award
to survivors of the crash who resided in countries that would not
provide the requisite diagnostic examinations free of charge. By
contrast, courts adopting medical monitoring claims in the toxic tort
context generally have not barred plaintiffs from recovering the costs of
medical examinations covered by collateral sources such as insurance.
Notwithstanding these distinctions, a number of courts have
uncritically applied Friends For All Children in adopting a medical
monitoring claim or remedy for uninjured plaintiffs in toxic tort cases.
In Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,20 for example, four
landowners living adjacent to a landfill alleged that toxic wastes
disposed at the landfill had exposed the plaintiffs to various
carcinogens. The plaintiffs conceded that they had not suffered any
physical injuries, but alleged that the exposure had increased their risk
of developing cancer. The trial court agreed and awarded almost
$150,000 to enable the plaintiffs to "receive periodic medical
monitoring to detect the onset of disease at the earliest possible time.'
21
Relying heavily on Friends For All Children, the California
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and recognized
medical monitoring as a remedy for asymptomatic plaintiffs. The court
cited four public policy considerations in support of its conclusion.
17 Id.; see also Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 183 n.5 (Or. 2008).
18 Witherspoon v. Philip Morris Inc., 964 F. Supp. 455, 467 (D.D.C. 1997); see also
Donald L. DeVries & Ian Gallacher, Medical Monitoring and Medical Device Cases:
Taking the Temperature of a New Theory, 68 DEF. COUNSEL. J. 163, 164 (Apr. 2001)
(Friends For All Children "does not represent the law of the District of Columbia").
19 George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of the
Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 240
(1993).
20 Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
21 Id. at 801-03.
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First, "there is an important public health interest in fostering access to
medical testing for individuals whose exposure to toxic chemicals
creates an enhanced risk of disease, particularly in light of the value of
early diagnosis and treatment for many cancer patients." 22 "Second,
there is a deterrence value in recognizing medical surveillance claims-
'allowing plaintiffs to recover the costs of this care deters irresponsible
discharge of toxic chemicals by defendants.' 23 Third, "'[t]he
availability of a substantial remedy before the consequences of the
plaintiffs' exposure are manifest may also have the beneficial effect of
preventing or mitigating serious future illnesses and thus reduce the
overall costs to the responsible parties.' '24 Finally, "it would be
inequitable for an individual wrongfully exposed to dangerous toxins,
but unable to prove that cancer or disease is likely, to have to pay the
expense of medical monitoring when such intervention is clearly
reasonable and necessary."
25
To determine "the reasonableness and necessity of monitoring,"
the Potter court identified the following relevant factors:
(1) the significance and extent of the plaintiffs exposure to
chemicals; (2) the toxicity of the chemicals; (3) the relative
increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed
plaintiff as a result of the exposure, when compared to (a)
the plaintiffs chances of developing the disease had he or
she not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members
of the public at large of developing the disease; (4) the
seriousness of the disease for which the plaintiff is at risk;
and (5) the clinical value of early detection and diagnosis. 26
The court chose a court-supervised fund rather than lump sum damages
as the remedy, explaining that "a fund remedy will encourage plaintiffs
to spend money to safeguard their health by not allowing them the
option of spending the money for other purposes. 27
Potter is far from alone. Although they differ both as to the
elements necessary to obtain relief and the form any relief should take,
the Supreme Courts of Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Utah, and
West Virginia have all recognized claims or remedies for medical
22 Id. at 824.
23 Id. (internal alterations omitted).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 824-25.
27 Id. at 825 n.28.
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monitoring without proof of physical injury.28 Several states'
intermediate appellate courts, as well as a few federal courts predicting
state law, have also adopted medical monitoring as either an
29independent cause of action or as a remedy tied to an established tort.
As we have said, the trend toward recognition of medical
monitoring claims for uninjured plaintiffs shifted in 1997, when the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Buckley. In that case, an
asymptomatic railroad worker exposed to asbestos brought suit for the
costs of medical monitoring under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
("FELA"). Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Breyer rejected a claim
for medical monitoring absent physical injury.30
The Buckley Court cited three principal public policy
considerations in support of its conclusion. First, because "the
particular cancer-related costs at issue are the extra monitoring costs,
over and above those otherwise recommended" for non-exposed
individuals, "their identification will sometimes pose special
'difficult[ies] for judges and juries."' 3 1 The Court explained that
"[t]hose difficulties in part can reflect uncertainty among medical
professionals about just which tests are most usefully administered and
when," and continued by noting that "in part those difficulties can
reflect the fact that scientists will not always see a medical need to
28 Meyer v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 717-18 (Mo. 2007); Ayers v. Twp. of
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the
Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145-46 (Pa. 1997); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858
P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431
(W. Va. 1999). Some courts have limited plaintiffs' ability to recover medical
monitoring under these states' laws outside the context of toxic tort litigation. E.g.,
Sinclair v. Merck & Co., 948 A.2d 587, 595 (N.J. 2008) (declining to extend medical
monitoring to products liability litigation); Ratliff v. Mentor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 2d
926, 929 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (same)
29 E.g., Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Cook
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (D. Col. 1991); Petito v. A.H.
Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re Methyl Tertiary
Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 298, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(Maryland law); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984); Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 879-81 (S.D. Ohio 1994); see also
Allgood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2005 WL 2218371, at *7 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (stating a
"provisional prediction that the Indiana courts are likely to recognize a claim for
medical monitoring damages"); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 575
n.7 (6th Cir. 2005) (medical monitoring claims "are probably proper" under
Tennessee law).
30 Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 521 U.S. 424, 427 (1997).
311d. at 441.
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provide systematic scientific answers to the relevant legal question,
namely, whether an exposure calls for extra monitoring."
Second, Buckley noted that "tens of millions of individuals may
have suffered exposure to substances that might justify some form of
substance-exposure-related medical monitoring. ' 33 Moreover, the Court
recognized that medical monitoring can be a costly remedy, comparing
the plaintiffs request for "damages worth $950 annually for 36 years"
with the $12,500 paid to injured asbestos claimants in cases settled by
the Center for Claims Resolution during a five-year period and the
average of $8,810 paid to "nonmalignant plaintiffs among this
group." 34 The Court concluded that the extraordinarily high number of
potential medical monitoring plaintiffs, "along with uncertainty as to
the amount of liability, could threaten both a 'flood' of less important
cases (potentially absorbing resources better left available to those
more seriously harmed), and the systemic harms that can accompany
'unlimited and unpredictable liability' (for example, vast testing
liability adversely affecting the allocation of scarce medical
resources). 35
Third, Buckley stated that a "full-blown ordinary tort liability
rule would ignore the presence of existing alternative sources of
payment, thereby leaving a court uncertain about how much of the
potentially large recoveries would pay for otherwise unavailable
medical testing and how much would accrue to plaintiffs for whom
employers or other sources (say, insurance now or in the future) might
provide monitoring in any event." 36 Thus, although acknowledging
"important competing considerations" and the "sympathetic" plaintiff,
the Court found those considerations to be outweighed "by the potential




13 Id. at 442.
34 Id.
35 Id. (internal citation omitted).
3 6 Id. at 442-43.
37 Id. at 443. Although some courts have distinguished Buckley because it involved a
request for lump sum damages rather than a court-supervised fund, "the policy
concerns cited by" Buckley are equally "applicable to a medical-monitoring fund."
Norwood v. Raytheon Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 659, 666 n.12 (W.D. Tex. 2006). And
although some courts may be tempted to distinguish Buckley because it addressed an
independent cause of action for medical monitoring rather than a request for
monitoring as a remedy tied to an established tort, that too is a distinction without a
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Since Buckley, the Supreme Courts of Alabama, Kentucky,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, and Oregon have all relied on the
public policy considerations discussed in Justice Breyer's opinion in
rejecting medical monitoring claims for asymptomatic plaintiffs.38
Several states' lower courts and federal courts predicting state law have
relied on similar public policy considerations in rejecting medical
monitoring claims.39 Taken together, these cases show that Buckley
ushered in a "recent trend of rejecting medical monitoring" for
asymptomatic plaintiffs.4 °
In Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., for example, the plaintiffs
brought a putative class action on behalf of individuals who lived or
worked near a manufacturing plant owned by Dow Chemical. The
plaintiffs alleged that Dow had negligently exposed them to dioxin, a
potentially hazardous chemical. The plaintiffs conceded that they did
not have physical injuries, but claimed that their alleged exposure
placed them at an increased risk of contracting various diseases.
Accordingly, they demanded that Dow fund a court-supervised medical
monitoring program to screen the class members for symptoms of
dioxin-related diseases.4'
difference. Plaintiffs must prove an injury to prevail regardless of whether medical
monitoring is framed as an independent claim or as a remedy.
38 Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 832 (Ala. 2001); Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002); Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684,
704 (Mich. 2005); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 7 (Miss.
2007); Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 437 (Nev. 2001); Lowe v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 187 (Or. 2008).
39 E.g., Bowerman v. United Illuminating, 1998 WL 91027 1, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 15, 1998); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 1984);
Witherspoon v. Philip Morris Inc., 964 F. Supp. 455, 467 (D.D.C. 1997); Parker v.
Wellman, 2007 WL 1149982, at *4 (11 th Cir. Apr. 18, 2007) (Georgia law); Johnson
v. Abbott Labs., 2004 WL 3245947, at *6 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Dec. 31, 2004); Burton v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515, 1523 (D. Kan. 1995); Thompson v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 552 (D. Minn. 1999); Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d
946, 963 (8th Cir. 2000) (Nebraska law); Curl v. Am. Multimedia, Inc., 654 S.E.2d
76, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 2001 WL 34010613, at *5
(D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2001); Jones v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 2000 WL 33727733, at *8
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2000) (Tennessee law); Norwood, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 668; Ball
v. Joy Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1991) (Virginia law); Purjet v. Hess Oil
Virgin Islands Corp., 1986 WL 1200, at *4 (D.V.1. Jan. 8, 1996); Duncan v. N.W.
Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 608-09 (W.D. Wash. 2001); see also La. Civ. Code
Ann. art. 2315.40 Norwood, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 667.
4 Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 685-86 (Mich. 2005).
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In an opinion that quickly proved to be influential, the Michigan
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' request for medical monitoring
and reaffirmed "the principle that a plaintiff must demonstrate a present
physical injury to person or property in addition to economic losses
that result from that injury in order to recover under a negligence
theory.",42 The court reasoned that requiring "a present physical injury
to person or property serves a number of important ends," including the
reduction of fraudulent claims and the provision of a clear line
permitting fact-finders to distinguish between plaintiffs who have a
cause of action and those who do not.43 In doing so, the court rejected
the plaintiffs' argument "that the need to pay for medical monitoring is
itself a present injury sufficient to sustain a cause of action for
negligence. 4 4 The court explained that the plaintiffs' argument was an
"attempt to blur the distinction between 'injury' and 'damages.' While
plaintiffs arguably demonstrate economic losses that would otherwise
satisfy the 'damages' element of a traditional tort claim, the fact
remains that these economic losses are wholly derivative of a possible
future injury rather than an actual, present injury." 45 Accordingly, the
court held that "the medical expenses plaintiffs claim to have suffered
(and will suffer in the future) are not compensable" because the
"plaintiffs have not alleged a present physical injury. 4 6
In addition to requiring that plaintiffs prove a physical injury,
the Henry court stated that the "plaintiffs' claim may also have
undesirable effects that neither we nor the parties can satisfactorily
predict." 47 First, "recognizing a cause of action based solely on
exposure-one without a requirement of a present injury-would
create a potentially limitless pool of plaintiffs." 4 8 "Litigation of these
preinjury claims could drain resources needed to compensate those with
manifest physical injuries and a more immediate need for medical
care." 49 Second, citing authorities questioning the value of some
monitoring regimes, the court pointed out that "it is far from settled that
judicially supervised medical monitoring is an unmitigated benefit for
all concerned., 50 Third, "we have no assurance that a decision in





4 7 Id. at 694.
48 Id.
49 id.
"°Id. at 695 n.14.
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plaintiffs' favor ... will not wreak enormous harm on Michigan's
citizens and its economy.",5' Citing Buckley, the court concluded: "We
would be unwise, to say the least, to alter the common law in the
manner requested by plaintiffs when it is unclear what the
consequences of such a decision may be and when we have strong
suspicions, shared by our nation's highest court, that they may well be
disastrous. 52
The court noted that legislatures, not courts, should resolve the
type of "far-reaching and complex public policy issues" raised by the
plaintiffs' request for medical monitoring. It explained that the
decision whether to adopt a medical monitoring claim "necessarily
involves a drawing of lines reflecting considerations of public policy,
and a judicial body is ill-advised to draw such lines given the limited
range of interests represented by the parties and the resultant lack of the
necessary range of information on which to base a resolution." 54 In
addition to the difficulties posed by the threshold question of whether
to adopt a medical monitoring claim, the court noted "practical
questions of how such a monitoring program would work., 55 For
example, determining eligibility for monitoring "involves the
consideration of a number of practical questions and the balancing of a
host of competing interests-a task more appropriate for the legislative
branch than the judiciary., 56 Finally, the difficulties inherent in judicial
administration of a medical monitoring program "would necessarily
impose huge clerical burdens on a court system lacking the resources to
effectively administer such a regime." 57 Courts simply do not "possess
the technical expertise necessary to effectively administer a program
heavily dependent on scientific disciplines such as medicine, chemistry,
and environmental science. The burdens of such a system would more
appropriately be borne by an administrative agency specifically created
and empowered to administer such a program." Given all of these
concerns, the court decided to "defer" resolution of the plaintiffs'
request for medical monitoring "to the people's representatives in the
5' Id. at 696-97.
52 Id. at 697.
" Id. at 699 n.24.54 id. at 697.
" Id. at 698.
56 Id.
17 Id. at 699.
58 Id.
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Legislature, who are better suited to undertake the complex task of
balancing the competing societal interests at stake."
'5 9
II. FROM MORRISSY TO JENSEN: ILLINOIS' EVOLVING
TREATMENT OF MEDICAL MONITORING CLAIMS.
The first Illinois appellate court to consider a request for
medical monitoring suggested that Illinois would not recognize such a
claim without proof of a physical injury. In Morrissy v. Eli Lilly &
Co., a woman whose mother had ingested the anti-miscarriage drug
Diethylstilbestrol ("DES") during pregnancy brought a purported class
action against numerous DES manufacturers and related defendants.
The plaintiff alleged that the class members had symptoms suggesting
that they would contract cancer from their exposure to DES. The
plaintiff requested that the court order the defendants to establish a fund
with more than $41 million to provide the class members with medical
monitoring for the rest of their lives.
61
The appellate court affirmed the denial of class certification,
holding that "individual determinations of proximate cause"
predominated over any common issues.62 In doing so, the court
characterized the plaintiff's claim as "essentially alleging the existence
of latent disease as a present injury. ' 63 The court rejected that claim,
stating that the link "suggested between exposure to DES In [sic] utero
and the possibility of developing cancer or other injurious conditions in
the future is an insufficient basis upon which to recognize a present
injury. 64 It reasoned that "possible future damages in a personal injury
action are not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur." 65 At
least two trial courts subsequently relied on Morrissy in holding that
59 Id. at 686.
60 Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
61 Id. at 1371-72.
62 Id. at 1376. In a subsequent article, we will analyze whether courts may properly
certify medical monitoring class actions.63 1id.
64 id.
65 Id. The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently clarified that plaintiffs who have
already incurred a physical injury may recover damages for the increased risk of
future injuries even if the future injuries are "not reasonably certain to occur." Dillon
v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 370 (Ill. 2002) (permitting recovery for increased
risk of future harm where jury awarded damages "for past pain and suffering" based
on defendants' negligence in leaving a catheter fragment in plaintiff's heart).
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Illinois does not recognize a medical monitoring claim absent proof of
a present physical injury. 66
In Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.,67 however, a federal
district court predicted that "the Illinois Supreme Court would uphold a
claim for medical monitoring without requiring plaintiffs to plead and
prove ... a present physical injury." The Carey plaintiffs had filed a
putative class action against a manufacturer of thorium and the
manufacturer's parent corporation, alleging that the defendants had
improperly disposed of radioactive byproducts called thorium tailings.
Although they did not suffer from any physical injuries, the plaintiffs
contended that their exposure to thorium tailings increased their risk of
contracting various diseases. The plaintiffs pled claims for, among
other things, strict liability and negligence, and requested relief in the
form of a court-supervised fund to pay for the costs of medical
monitoring.
68
In an opinion that failed to cite Buckley, the court conceded that
"no Illinois court has as yet accepted such a claim in the absence of any
present physical injury." 69 Nevertheless, relying almost exclusively on
a Third Circuit decision interpreting Pennsylvania law, the court held
that plaintiffs may recover the costs of medical monitoring "should
expert testimony establish that such expenditures are necessary 'to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty. '" '7 The court reasoned that
allowing plaintiffs to recover the costs of medical monitoring "deters
irresponsible discharge of toxic chemicals by defendants and
encourages plaintiffs to detect and treat their injuries as soon as
possible." 71 Attempting to distinguish Morrissy, the court stated that
"the plaintiff in Morrissy sought a fund for treatment for future injuries
as well as monitoring, while the plaintiffs in [Carey] sought only
66 Hayes v. ACandS, Inc., No. 95-CH-01835, Order at 12-13 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 30,
1996), appeal dismissed, No. 1-97-0606 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 27, 1998); Blesy v.
Kustom Signals, Inc., No. 94-CH-03564, Tr. at 8 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 1995), aff'd,
No. 1-95-4302 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 24, 1997).
67 Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. 111. 1998).68Id. at 1111, 1117.
69 Id. at 1118.
70 Id. at 1120 (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990)).
The only Illinois decision that Carey cited in support of its holding stands for the
unremarkable proposition that plaintiffs who already suffer from a physical injury
may recover the costs of medical monitoring. Id. at 1119 (citing Betts v. Manville
Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 588 N.E.2d 1193 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)).
7 Id. at 1120.
2009]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
monitoring damages." 72 The court failed to explain why the plaintiffs'
request of "a fund for treatment for future injuries" in Morrissy
prevented the appellate court from taking the lesser step of establishing
a medical monitoring fund. The Carey court subsequently
acknowledged that there were "substantial grounds for differences of
opinion" and certified for an interlocutory appeal the issue of whether
to adopt a medical monitoring claim without proof of physical injury. 73
The Seventh Circuit declined to accept interlocutory review, and the
parties ultimately settled.74
Relying in part on Carey, the Illinois Appellate Court first
recognized a remedy for medical monitoring without proof of physical
injury in Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass 'n.75 In Lewis, the plaintiffs
brought a purported class action against several lead paint
manufacturers on behalf of all "parents and guardians of minor children
[living in Illinois] who have undergone or will undergo medical
screening, assessment, or monitoring for lead poisoning or latent
diseases associated with lead poisoning., 76 The plaintiffs asserted six
different claims and sought damages as a remedy for each of the claims
to compensate them for the costs of medical monitoring. The trial court
dismissed the action because the plaintiffs failed to allege a physical
injury.
The appellate court reversed in part in a cursory opinion that
failed to cite Buckley or any other decision rejecting medical
monitoring absent physical injury. The court acknowledged that in
Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, the Illinois Supreme Court had held that
plaintiffs may obtain damages for an increased risk of future harm only
by proving that "the defendant's breach of duty caused a present injury
which resulted in that increased risk,",77 with any damages for the
increased risk of harm "reflect[ing] the low probability of
occurrence." 7s However, the Lewis court cited Friends For All Children
in stating that "an action seeking recovery for the cost of [medical]
examinations is distinct from a claim seeking recovery for an increased
risk of harm.",79 The court reasoned that "[u]nlike a claim seeking
12Id. at 1119.
73 Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. LLC, 1999 WL 966484, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30,
1999).
74 Perez v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 262, 267 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
75 Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
76 id.
77 Id. at 873 (emphasis added).
78 Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 370 (Il1. 2002).
79 793 N.E.2d at 873.
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damages for an increased risk of future harm, a claim seeking damages
for the cost of a medical examination is not speculative.' 80 Relying on
Carey, the court concluded:
If a defendant's breach of duty makes it necessary for a
plaintiff to incur expenses to determine if he or she has
been physically injured, we find no reason why the expense
of such an examination is any less a present injury
compensable in a tort action than the medical expenses that
might be incurred to treat an actual physical injury caused
by such a breach of duty.81
Lewis failed to offer any guidance concerning the elements that
plaintiffs must establish to obtain medical monitoring.82
The Illinois Appellate Court's most recent treatment of medical
monitoring came in Jensen v. Bayer AG.83 Jensen arose out of a
putative class action alleging that use of the anti-cholesterol drug
Baycol subjected the class members to an increased risk of contracting
rhabdomyolysis-a rare condition that can result in muscle breakdown
and kidney failure-and necessitated that plaintiffs undergo medical
monitoring. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs
complaint, holding that even if "our supreme court would recognize" a
medical monitoring claim absent physical injury, the plaintiff failed to
present any evidence showing that monitoring was necessary.84
Interestingly, the panel suggested that plaintiffs cannot rely on Lewis to
recover medical monitoring. The court explained that the plaintiff in
Lewis "sought compensation for medical testing to detect a present
physical injury. ' 85 Lewis "did not address the question posed by
plaintiff here; namely, whether a plaintiff may bring a claim for
medical monitoring for potential future harm, where no present injury
is shown."
86
80 Id. at 874.
81 Id.
82 Jensen v. Bayer AG, No. 01 CH 13319, 2003 WL 22962431, at *4 (I11. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 15, 2003), aff'd, 862 N.E.2d 1091 (IlI. App. Ct. 2007) ("Lewis does not give trial
courts much guidance on what elements are sufficient to state an independent claim of
medical monitoring."); see also Pelzer v. Transformer Co., No. 01 C 6485, 2005 WL
1651729, at *3 (N.D. 111. July 6, 2005) ("Illinois courts and federal courts have
grappled with the medical monitoring remedy and have produced less than clear
results.").
83 862 N.E.2d 1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
84 Id. at 1100.
851d. at 1101.86 id.
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Although Jensen demonstrates that the question whether to
adopt a medical monitoring claim remains open in Illinois' lower
courts, the plaintiffs' bar has taken advantage of Carey and Lewis by
filing an increasing number of lawsuits that seek medical monitoring on
behalf of uninjured individuals. 87 Plaintiffs' tactics have met with some
success. In Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., for example, a Pennsylvania
federal district court held that although Illinois law "is unclear," "the
Illinois Supreme Court likely would recognize a claim for medical
monitoring" without physical injury.88 The court observed that in
Dillon, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed injured plaintiffs to recover
for the increased risk of future harm in part because of "the single
recovery principle, which 'requires that all damages, future as well as
past, must be presented and considered at the time of trial."'"9 While
acknowledging that Dillon involved a plaintiff with physical injuries,
the Gates court asserted that medical monitoring claims do not require
physical injuries because "the cost of diagnostic testing is a
compensable 'injury,' albeit financial, in and of itself."9 Moreover,
Gates reasoned that "under the principle of single recovery, plaintiffs
do not have the option to wait until symptoms appear."
91
For the reasons we discuss below, Gates rests on a misreading
of Illinois law. Moreover, cases like Morrissy, Carey, Jensen, and
Gates demonstrate that courts are divided on this important issue. As a
result, it is imperative that the Illinois Supreme Court resolve once and
87 E.g., Duffin v. Exelon Corp., No. 06 C 1382, 2006 WL 2578954 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5,
2006) (alleging exposure to radioactive waste); Woll v. Astrazeneca Pharm. LP, No.
3:06-57 (S.D. Ill.) (alleging use of the drug Astrazeneca); Hubbard v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. 06-51 (S.D. 111.) (alleging use of a birth control patch); Grant v. Ill. Tool
Works, Inc., No. 04-CH-21112 (Ill. Cir. Ct.) (alleging exposure to manganese in
welding fume). The plaintiffs' bar has also relied on Carey and Lewis in seeking to
represent Illinois citizens in putative multi-state medical monitoring class actions.
E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2006); In re
Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (D.
Minn. Apr. 27, 2006); Mehl v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1104
(D.N.D. 2006).
88 No. 06-1743, 2007 WL 2155665, at *2 n.5 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2007).
89 Id. at *3 (quoting Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 369 (111. 2002)).
90 Gates, 2007 WL 2155665, at *3.
91 Id. at *5; see also Stella v. LVMH Perfumes & Cosmetics USA, Inc., 564 F. Supp.
2d 833, 836 & n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("in the absence of guidance from the Illinois
Supreme Court on the propriety of medical monitoring claims under Illinois law, I
find persuasive the federal case law finding such a claim cognizable"); Muniz v.
Rexnord Corp., No. 04 C 2405, 2006 WL 1519571, at *5, *7 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2006)




for all whether Illinois recognizes a medical monitoring claim or
remedy for uninjured plaintiffs.
III. RECOGNITION OF A CLAIM FOR MEDICAL
MONITORING WOULD REVOLUTIONIZE ILLINOIS
TORT LAW BY ABANDONING THE REQUIREMENT
THAT PLAINTIFFS PROVE A PRESENT PHYSICAL
INJURY.
We are unaware of any Illinois Supreme Court decision holding
that a plaintiff may obtain relief in tort without proving a present
physical or mental injury or property damage. To the contrary, the
Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected plaintiffs' requests to
abandon that longstanding requirement. 9 2 The court has held that "'to
recover for medical expenses, the plaintiff must prove that,"' among
other things, "'she necessarily incurred the medical expenses because
of injuries resulting from the defendant's negligence.' 93 In addition,
the court has specifically stated that "[a] threat of future harm, not yet
realized, is not actionable." 94 Likewise, courts across the country have
recognized that the adoption of a claim or remedy for medical
92 E.g., Pasquale v. Speed Prods. Eng'g, 654 N.E.2d 1365, 1373 (Ill. 1995) ("physical
harm is required to state a bystander's cause of action and recovery [sic] based on
strict liability"); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983)
(bystanders in "zone of physical danger" negligence actions "must show physical
injury or illness as a result of the emotional distress caused by the defendant's
negligence," with recovery limited to "physical injury or illness resulting from
emotional distress").
93 Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Ill. 2005) (emphasis added); see also
Jackson v. Seib, 866 N.E.2d 663, 672-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (rejecting a rule "that
permits the plaintiff to recover for all medical testing reasonably related to the events
at issue regardless of whether the testing reveals an injury" because such a rule
"would be contrary to our public policy and well-established principles of negligence,
which require," among other things, "damages before a person can be held liable for
the medical expenses of another").
94 Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1995); see also Bd. of Educ.
v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ill. 1989) ("dangerousness which creates a
risk of harm is insufficient standing alone to award damages in either strict products
liability or negligence"); Yu v. IBM Corp., 732 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (111. App. Ct.
2000) (affirming dismissal of complaint alleging latent defect in computer because
plaintiff failed to state "a legally cognizable present injury or damage"); Verb v.
Motorola, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1287, 1295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (affirming dismissal of
complaint alleging that cell phone use placed plaintiffs at increased risk of future
harm because "'possible future damages in a personal injury action are not
compensable').
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monitoring without proof of a physical injury would be "a drastic and
fundamental departure from traditional tort doctrine," 95 require courts
"to completely rewrite [the] tort-law system, ' 96 and "represent a radical
extension of currently existing ... law."
97
The requirement that plaintiffs establish a physical injury to
recover in tort serves two principal interests. First, it provides
boundaries allowing courts to distinguish among cases warranting their
attention." As Dean Prosser recognized:
It does not lie within the power of any judicial system to
remedy all human wrongs. The obvious limitations upon
the time of the courts, the difficulty in many cases of
ascertaining the real facts or of providing any effective
remedy, have meant that there must be some selection of
those more serious injuries which have the prior claim to
redress and are dealt with more easily.
99
The limitations on courts' ability to right all perceived wrongs have
particular relevance in medical monitoring cases because harmful
substances are ubiquitous in modem society. The Supreme Court
recognized as much in Buckley, stating that "contacts, even extensive
contacts, with serious carcinogens are common."100 Indeed, a recent
study conducted by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
found that every one of the approximately 5000 individuals tested had
at least 148 different toxins present in their bodies.' 0' Therefore, if
Illinois law permitted recovery in tort based on nothing more than mere
exposure to a harmful substance, virtually every Illinois resident would
95 Parker v. Wellman, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1302 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 2005), aff'd,
2007 WL 1149982 (11 th Cir. Apr. 18, 2007).
96 Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 830 (Ala. 2001).
97 Norwood v. Raytheon Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 659, 668 (W.D. Tex. 2006); see also
Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Ky. 2002) (abandoning the
physical injury requirement would be a "sweeping change to traditional tort law").
98 Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 142 P.3d 1079, 1091 (Or. Ct. App. 2006), aff'd,
183 P.3d 181 (Or. 2008) (requiring proof of physical injury "constrain[s] the
*ossibility of limitless or indeterminate liability").
W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 (5th ed. 1984);
see also Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1985) ("[t]here must be some
level of harm which one should absorb without recompense as the price he pays for
living in an organized society").
100 Buckley v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 521 U.S. 424, 434 (1997).
101 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &




be a potential plaintiff.10 2 And as we discuss below, the dramatic
increase in the pool of potential plaintiffs would have a host of negative
consequences.
The second principal interest served by the physical injury
requirement is to "corroborate the authenticity of a plaintiffs
allegations and provide 'proof that the plaintiff has been harmed."'
10 3
To borrow from our hypothetical involving Acme's sale of the
prescription drug Generic, suppose that Acme later sold Generic over
the counter. In many cases, the only evidence that the plaintiff used
Generic would be the plaintiff's say-so. The present physical injury rule
requires the plaintiff to provide some objectively verifiable evidence
that he sustained the same type of injury that is allegedly caused by
Generic. To be sure, the physical injury requirement does not eliminate
fraudulent claims altogether. Some plaintiffs afflicted with the disease
allegedly caused by Generic will file lawsuits against Acme based on
false allegations of Generic use. But the physical injury requirement at
least serves to reduce the risk of fraudulent claims.
104
Abandoning the physical injury requirement would have
consequences for other legal rules as well. First, it is difficult to
reconcile a medical monitoring claim for uninjured plaintiffs with the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Dillon, which requires that
plaintiffs prove a present physical injury to prevail on a claim for
increased risk of future harm. 10 5 Recall that in Lewis and Gates, the
courts attempted to explain away this tension by suggesting that
102 E.g., Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 694 (Mich. 2005); Wood, 82
S.W.3d at 857-58 ("'Given that negligently distributed or discharged toxins can be
perceived to lie around every comer in the modem industrialized world, and their
effects on risk levels are at best speculative, the potential tort claims involved are
inherently limitless and endless."'); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d
424, 435 (W. Va. 1999) (Maynard, J., dissenting) ("the practical effect" of adopting a
medical monitoring claim "is to make almost every West Virginian a potential
plaintiff').
103 Terry C. Gay & Paige F. Rosato, Combating Fear of Injury and Medical
Monitoring Claims, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 554, 560 (Oct. 1994).
104 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring-Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1057, 1074 (1999) ("In order to determine whether money
should be transferred from a defendant to a plaintiff, a jury needs some objective
manifestation that an individual has been harmed."); see also Lowe v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 142 P.3d 1079, 1090-91 (Or. Ct. App. 2006), aff'd, 183 P.3d 181 (Or.
2008) (requiring proof of physical injury "enable[s] the courts to separate legitimate
claims from speculative or spurious ones").
105 Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 793 N.E.2d 849, 873 (111. App. Ct. 2003) (citing
Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 370 (Ill. 2002)).
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medical monitoring claims are less speculative than increased risk
claims. But courts that have adopted medical monitoring claims require
plaintiffs to show that the defendant's conduct increased (to varying
degrees) the plaintiffs risk of future harm. 10 6 Thus, a request for
medical monitoring "remains occasioned by a mere risk of possible
future harm."' 10 7 Medical monitoring claims are therefore just as
speculative as claims for increased risk of future harm because they
both base liability on speculation about the likelihood that the plaintiff
may someday contract a particular disease.' 08 Accordingly, if uninjured
plaintiffs may not sue for increased risk of future harm, then logically
plaintiffs may not recover medical monitoring absent physical injury.
Second, recognition of a medical monitoring claim for
uninjured plaintiffs may run afoul of the economic loss rule. In an
attempt to "avoid the consequences of open-ended tort liability," the
Illinois Supreme Court has long held that "[a]bsent injury to a
plaintiffs person or property, a claim presents an economic loss not
recoverable in tort." 1° 9 The costs of medical monitoring are, of course,
mere economic loss.1 10 Thus, a purported need to spend money on
medical monitoring cannot constitute the requisite "injury" because that
alleged harm is ".purely economic."""' Therefore, a clear tension
exists between the rule barring the recovery of mere economic loss in
106 E.g., Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa.
1997) (plaintiffs must prove "a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious
latent disease" to recover medical monitoring).
107 Lowe, 142 P.3d at 1092.
108 See Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking Medical Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 15
(1998) ("when one recalls that significant enhanced risk is almost always a predicate
to medical monitoring recovery, the distinction begins to look like an enhanced risk
'Trojan horse': enhanced risk is not compensable, but if you demonstrate an increased
risk of disease, you can recover medical monitoring costs ... as a means of
compensation for the enhanced risk").
109 In re Chicago Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 274-76 (Ill. 1997); see also Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 453 (11. 1982) ("plaintiff cannot recover
for solely economic loss under the tort theories of strict liability, negligence and
innocent misrepresentation").
110 City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1139-43 (Ill. 2004); see
also Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 439 (1997) (referring to
medical monitoring costs as an "economic 'injury"'); Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs.,
82 S.W.3d 849, 854-55 (Ky. 2002) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that her injury was
"'the financial expense of ... medical monitoring" because "'[t]he words 'physical
harm' are used to denote physical impairment of the human body, or of tangible
property' and "the only tangible property in question is [plaintiff s] money").
1 Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 186 (Or. 2008); see also Henry v.
Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Mich. 2005).
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tort and the abandonment of the physical injury requirement in order to
allow medical monitoring claims.
Third, adoption of a medical monitoring claim would require
courts to adjust rules governing the accrual of statutes of limitations.
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations
begins to run on personal injury claims "when the first symptoms begin
to appear." ' 1 2 Of course, courts could not apply that accrual rule to
medical monitoring claims, which by definition involve a plaintiff who
is asymptomatic.113
Finally, Illinois law requires plaintiffs to establish standing "by
demonstrating some injury to a legally cognizable interest."' 14 But as
some courts and commentators have noted, it is not at all clear that a
purported need for future medical monitoring constitutes an injury to a
"legally cognizable interest."' 115 In sum, the difficulty reconciling a
medical monitoring claim with other legal rules highlights the need for
caution in considering whether to depart from a longstanding rule such
as the physical injury requirement.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH
HEAVILY AGAINST ADOPTING A MEDICAL
MONITORING CLAIM ABSENT PROOF OF A
PHYSICAL INJURY.
As we discuss more fully below, the costs of adopting a medical
monitoring claim vastly outweigh the benefits that such a claim would
provide. First, a medical monitoring claim would result in a host of
negative consequences for current and future plaintiffs, the judicial
system, and society as a whole. Second, the medical community has
cast significant doubt upon the efficacy of monitoring for many
diseases. Third, the public policy considerations offered by courts in
112 Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 421 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill. 1981).
113 See Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 830 (Ala. 2001) (questioning the
impact of medical monitoring claims "upon our statutes of limitation and the legal
doctrines that have developed to guide the courts in the application of these statutes").
114 Viii. of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 837 N.E.2d 29, 39 (Ill. 2005).
15 Sutton v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007-09 (W.D. Tenn. 2003),
rev'd, 419 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (asymptomatic plaintiff seeking medical
monitoring due to implantation of defective medical device lacked requisite injury-in-
fact); DeVries & Gallacher, supra note 17, at 172 ("it would be difficult for medical
monitoring plaintiffs to allege present injuries-in-fact").
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support of a medical monitoring claim are insufficient to tip the scales
in favor of adopting such a claim.
A. Adoption Of A Medical Monitoring Claim Would
Have A Host Of Negative Consequences For Current
And Future Plaintiffs, The Judicial System, And
Society As A Whole.
1. Allowing Uninjured Plaintiffs To Sue Could
Bar Those Plaintiffs From Seeking
Compensation For Any Subsequently
Incurred Injuries And Would Deplete
Resources Needed To Compensate The
Injured.
Adoption of a medical monitoring claim for the uninjured
would endanger the claims of future plaintiffs who incur actual injuries.
Although "the perception seems to be that [medical monitoring]
damages are a relatively inexpensive means of addressing potential
problems, the reality is that damages for medical surveillance costs can
be staggering, especially in cases involving multiple plaintiffs." 1 6 For
example, a West Virginia jury recently required DuPont to fund a
medical monitoring program for forty years at an estimated cost of
more than $100 million; 1 7 in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, the New
Jersey Supreme Court approved of a medical monitoring award in
excess of $8 million for 139 plaintiffs;"18 and in Potter, the California
Supreme Court affirmed a medical monitoring award of $142,975 to
only four plaintiffs.' 19 Given the enormous pool of potential plaintiffs,
damages can rise exponentially. For example, a New Jersey lawsuit
alleging exposure to fen-phen sought nearly $1 billion for medical
monitoring, while a West Virginia medical monitoring class action
against tobacco manufacturers demanded $450 million. 120  But
"defendants do not have an endless supply of financial resources" to
116 Eric W. Wiechmann, Curse of the Unsick: Update on Latent Injury Claims in
Toxic Tort Cases, THE BRIEF 10, 44 (Summer 1996).
117 DuPont Guilty of Wanton, Willful, Reckless Conduct, Charleston Gazette, Oct. 20,
2007.
118 Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987).
119 Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 803 (Cal. 1993).
120 Gregory C. Reed, Medical Monitoring: The New Gold Rush, 68 DEF. COUNS. J.
141, 142 (Apr. 2001).
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pay both large medical monitoring awards and subsequent personal
injury awards.121 Thus, as a number of courts have recognized in
rejecting medical monitoring claims, "[s]pending large amounts of
money to satisfy medical monitoring judgments will impair
[defendants'] ability to fully compensate victims who emerge years
later with actual injuries that require immediate attention." 122
The asbestos litigation provides an object lesson for courts to
consider when deciding whether to adopt a claim for medical
monitoring without proof of a physical injury. To alleviate perceived
injustice in asbestos cases, many courts "deviated from accepted legal
principles to permit recoveries that traditionally would have been
barred.' 23 Courts thus expanded the pool of plaintiffs who could sue
for asbestos-related injuries, which resulted in "a disaster of major
proportions."' 124 Plaintiffs "with very serious harms had to wait long
periods of time before courts could hear their cases" and "some did not
live to obtain a remedy." 125 In addition, the flood of new plaintiffs led
to some eighty-five companies (at last count) filing for bankruptcy.12 6
The companies responsible for the vast majority of asbestos-related
injuries are thus now unable to compensate plaintiffs who contract
serious diseases such as mesothelioma. 127 The decreasing "number of
plausible, solvent asbestos defendants" has even led to tension between
plaintiffs' lawyers "that represent only very sick plaintiffs" and "firms
121 Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Ky. 2002).
122 Id.; see also Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 438 (1997);
Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 694 (Mich. 2005); Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co.,
755 F. Supp. 1344, 1372 (S.D. W. Va. 1990), aff'd sub nom., Ball v. Joy Techs., Inc.,
958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991) ("to prevent one injustice from arising from another, the
finite resources available must be spent both cautiously and wisely").
123 Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1073; see also James A. Henderson & Aaron D.
Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased
Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 817 (2002) (in
asbestos cases, "some courts have recognized theories of recovery that are both
substantively unfair and certain to favor claimants whose suffering is minor over
claimants who will suffer serious harm in the future").
124 Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 2 (Mar. 1991).
125 Schwartz et al., supra note 102, at 1073-74.
126 Mark A. Behrens & Christopher E. Appel, Medical Monitoring in Missouri After
Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.: Sound Policy Should Be Restored to a Vague
and Unsound Directive, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 135, 148 (2007).
127 In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000) ("The resources available to
persons injured by asbestos are steadily being depleted ... .. The continued
hemorrhaging of available funds deprives current and future victims of rightful
compensation.").
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that represent all plaintiffs, including the umimpaireds."' 128 As a leading
lawyer who represents only sick plaintiffs explained, "'the interests of
the unimpaired clients in fact are better served by giving them nothing
or very little now, but making sure that if they were to get sick later on
there will be money for them."" 2 9 The asbestos litigation teaches that
courts should be circumspect when examining requests to abandon
longstanding requirements in an attempt to provide all plaintiffs with
relief.
In addition to harming future injured plaintiffs, the adoption of a
medical monitoring claim for asymptomatic plaintiffs could have the
perverse effect of barring those same plaintiffs from suing should they
later incur actual injuries. As the Kentucky Supreme Court explained in
rejecting a medical monitoring claim, courts that permit an uninjured
plaintiff to sue for medical monitoring may well allow the plaintiff to
"collect a sum of money commensurate with the medical testing costs
that await her."' 130 If, however, the plaintiff "were to develop an injury
or illness later from the exposure," then the res judicata doctrine may
bar her from "bring[ing] another negligence claim for additional
damages."' 31 Thus, the "failure to recognize a cause of action in the
absence of an injury is essentially a safeguard that benefits victims. ' ' 3
Similarly, Illinois' rule against claim splitting-which is a
species of res judicata-"prohibits a plaintiff from suing for part of a
claim in one action and then suing for the remainder in another
action."'1 33 The Illinois Supreme Court considers separate claims to be
the same cause of action if they arise from a single group of operative
facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief. 134 In
other words, "[i]f the same facts are essential to the maintenance of
both proceedings or the same evidence is needed to sustain both, then
there is identity between the allegedly different causes of action
asserted."",135 Under a literal interpretation of this test, a pre-injury
claim for medical monitoring and a subsequent claim for personal
128 Roger Parloff, The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice, FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 2002, at
155, 170.129 id.
130 Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 858 (Ky. 2002).
131 id.
132 Id.
133 Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1206 (111. 1996).
134 River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 891 (111. 1998); see also
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).




injuries are the same cause of action because the claims arise from the
same facts, i.e., the plaintiff's exposure to allegedly harmful substances
produced by the defendant. Indeed, as we described above, the district
court in Gates appeared to suggest that the rule against claim splitting
requires asymptomatic plaintiffs to file suit for medical monitoring and
the increased risk of future harm in a single lawsuit.
To be sure, some courts outside of Illinois have held that the
rule against claim splitting does not bar plaintiffs from bringing
successive actions that allege differing asbestos-related injuries. 136 But
the Illinois Supreme Court has never addressed that issue and may well
agree with the minority view that plaintiffs must seek all damages-
including damages for future injuries-in one suit. 137 Indeed, the court
has suggested that it may follow the minority view, stating without
qualification that the rule against claim splitting "requires that all
damages, future as well as past, must be presented and considered at
the time of trial,, 138 and making clear that the rule is not to be discarded
lightly. 139 In any event, even if the Illinois Supreme Court were to
make an exception to the rule against claim splitting for asbestos cases,
it is far from clear that the court would extend such an exception
outside of the asbestos context. To the contrary, the Dillon court
permitted injured plaintiffs to recover for the increased risk of future
harm in part because that rule "better comports with this state's
136 E.g., Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2000); Sopha v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 601 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. 1999). In VaSalle v. Celotex
Corp., 515 N.E.2d 684, 686-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), a divided panel suggested in dicta
that the rule against claim splitting would not have barred the decedent's claim that he
contracted lung cancer due to exposure to the defendants' asbestos products if the
decedent had previously filed suit to recover for asbestosis. The Illinois Supreme
Court has never cited VaSalle.
137 E.g., Howell v. Celotex Corp., 904 F.2d 3, 5 (3d Cir. 1990); Joyce v. A.C. & S.,
Inc., 785 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761
F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985).
138 Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 369 (Ill. 2002); see also AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. c (1982) ("It is
immaterial that in trying the first action he was not in possession of enough
information about the damages, past or prospective, or that the damages turned out in
fact to be unexpectedly large and in excess of the judgment.").
139 Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (Ill. 1996) (rule against
claim splitting "is founded on the premise that litigation should have an end and that
no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of lawsuits"); see also
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Mottie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) ("res judicata ... is a
rule of fundamental and substantial justice, of public policy and of private peace,
which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts").
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principle of single recovery."' 140 Thus, adoption of a medical
monitoring claim absent physical injury runs the very real risk of
harming the same plaintiffs that the claim purports to help.
2. Medical Monitoring Claims Would Divert
Courts' Attention From More Important
Cases.
The expansion of the plaintiff pool through the recognition of a
medical monitoring claim would further clog Illinois' already crowded
courts. In addition to increasing the sheer number of lawsuits through
the abandonment of the physical injury requirement, a claim for
medical monitoring would also require courts to spend an inordinate
amount of time devising and administering medical monitoring
programs. As one commentator noted:
Devising a sound medical monitoring plan would require,
at a minimum, specifying the nature and amount of benefits
available, the source of funding and funding allotments, the
procedures for determining eligibility for monitoring, the
payment mechanism for the provider and the percentage of
provider reimbursement, when eligible parties may join the
program, the length of time the program should last, the
frequency of any periodic monitoring and the
circumstances in which that frequency can be changed to
allow special monitoring, the content of the monitoring
exams, whether the facility testing will be formal or
informal, and whether the service provider is to be designed
by the court or chosen by the claimant.' 41
Moreover, a medical monitoring program's "scope and administrative
operation will inevitably require adjustments, particularly if the
program's designers erroneously estimate funding needs or the number
of eligible participants. ' ' 142 Several courts have recognized these
problems in rejecting medical monitoring claims, explaining that the
14' Dillon, 771 N.E.2d at 369.
141 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way and the Wrong





adoption of such claims "will potentially clog the courts as contingency
fee lawyers use consumers as vehicles for enormous awards."
143
Illinois courts have expressed similar concerns about the
judiciary's ability to operate effectively in refusing to adopt claims that
would have consumed a great deal of judicial resources. In rejecting the
market share liability theory, for instance, the Illinois Supreme Court
explained that adoption of the theory "and the concomitant burden
placed on the courts and the parties will imprudently bog down the
judiciary in an almost futile endeavor. This would also create a
tremendous cost, both monetarily and in terms of the workload, on the
court system Similarly, the Cook County Circuit Court
established an "Asbestos Deferred Registry" that placed asymptomatic
plaintiffs' asbestos-related claims on a deferred docket pending the
onset of actual injuries. 145 In approving the registry, the Illinois
Appellate Court observed that "the unfortunate reality is that many of
the most severely affected claimants might be unable to gain access to
the courts in a timely fashion if the courts are required to consider each
case as it is filed and without regard to the severity of the injury."' 146
Given the limitless pool of potential plaintiffs and the ongoing
need to supervise medical monitoring programs, the recognition of a
medical monitoring claim would have an even greater effect on courts'
ability to function effectively than would the market share theory or the
processing of asymptomatic plaintiffs' asbestos claims. Nor is there any
pressing need for courts to take on the added burden of hearing medical
monitoring cases-the benefits of monitoring are (as we explain
below) illusory in many cases and "money awarded for the purpose of
health care will go in large percentage to [plaintiffs'] lawyers, not the
exposure victims." '' In short, Illinois courts would be better suited to
focus more attention on cases involving plaintiffs who have actually
been harmed rather than diluting that focus by hearing the claims of the
uninjured.
143 Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 858 (Ky. 2002); see also Ball v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1372 (S.D. W. Va. 1990), aff'd sub nom., Ball v. Joy
Techs., Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991)(medical monitoring claims "could
potentially devastate the court system").
144 Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 338 (111. 1990).
145 In re Asbestos Cases, 586 N.E.2d 521, 521 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
146 Id. at 523.
147 Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858.
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3. Medical Monitoring Claims Would Diminish
Scarce Medical Resources And Reduce The
Accessibility Of Beneficial Products.
As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley, the recognition of a
medical monitoring claim might affect "the allocation of scarce medical
resources." 148 Indeed, in an apparent attempt "to inflate as much as
possible the cost of yearly monitoring per plaintiff so as to maximize
plaintiffs' damage award and their attorneys' contingent fees,"'
149
plaintiffs typically request a wide array of diagnostic exams. In one
case, plaintiffs alleging exposure to PCBs requested amniocentesis,
developmental and achievement testing, electrocardiography,
pulmonary function tests, mammography, sigmoidoscopy, urine
cytology, sputum cytology, basic immunotoxicology panel,
chromosomal analysis, complete optomologic evaluation, complete
cardiovascular evaluation, complete neurological evaluation, complete
gastrointestinal evaluation, complete urinalysis, PSA, CBC, urine
porphyrin, and male fertility evaluation.' 50  In a world of limited
medical resources, granting such wide-ranging requests is costly,
particularly in class actions where the number of plaintiffs can rise into
the thousands. Courts should consider the effect of awarding medical
monitoring to asymptomatic plaintiffs on the provision of medical




A medical monitoring claim for uninjured plaintiffs also may
affect the availability and cost of insurance, resulting in higher costs for
and reduced production of beneficial products. 152 To illustrate, suppose
that Illinois adopted a claim for medical monitoring without proof of
physical injury. Assuming that insurance would be available at all, rates
would no doubt rise to cover the risk of judgments against companies
like our hypothetical Acme. As a result, Acme would either raise the
price of its drugs-thereby placing them out of reach for many low-
income consumers-or abandon their manufacture altogether. But that
149 Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997).
149 Thomas M. Goutman, Medical Monitoring: How Bad Science Makes Bad Law 15
(2001).
150 Id. at 14-15 (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 1997)).
'5' D. Scott Aberson, Note: A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the
Approach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted With the
Issue, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1095, 1121 (2006) ("medical monitoring potentially
wastes scarce resources and clogs an already congested health care system").
152 Gay, supra note 101, at 563.
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result directly conflicts with the Illinois Supreme Court's recognition of
"the social desirability of encouraging the research and development of
beneficial drugs."' 53 Indeed, in an analogous situation, the Illinois
Supreme Court based its rejection of the market share liability theory in
part on its conclusion that the "added potential for liability" created by
adoption of the theory "will likely contribute to diminishing
participants in the market as well as research and availability of
,,154drugs. Accordingly, courts should also weigh the effects that
medical monitoring claims would have on the accessibility of beneficial
products when deciding whether to adopt the claim without requiring
proof of a physical injury.
B. The Benefits Of Medical Monitoring Have Been
Vastly Oversold.
Courts that have adopted claims for medical monitoring often
betray a fundamental misconception about the benefits that monitoring
provides. In Ayers, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated
that "[t]he value of early diagnosis and treatment for cancer patients is
well-documented."'' 55 Yet the medical community has reached a
distinctly different conclusion. As one commentator noted, "[t]he
excessive claims" made about medical monitoring "in regard to the
prevention of disease have little or no relation to reality or
objectivity."' 156 In short, courts must "disabuse themselves of the notion
... that medical testing is invariably useful or beneficial to the person
tested."'15
7
To begin with, undergoing a battery of diagnostic exams is no
walk in the park.' 58 Rather, "it cannot be stressed greatly enough that
medical monitoring is a medical intervention into a patient's life,
qualitatively similar to other potentially harmful interventions such as
starting a patient on a medication or performing surgery."' 159 A recent
study reports that Americans are being exposed to record amounts of
153 Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ill. 1980).
154 Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 342 (Ill. 1990).
155 Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987).
156 W.K.C. MORGAN, Medical Monitoring with Particular Attention to Screening for
Lung Cancer, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 157, 157 (1984).
157 McCarter, supra note 18, at 276.
158 Id. ("there can be medical risk associated with the testing procedures themselves").
159 Christopher P. Guzelian et al., A Quantitative Methodology for Determining the
Need for Exposure-Prompted Medical Monitoring, 79 IND. L.J. 57, 67 (2004).
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ionizing radiation-potentially the most hazardous form of radiation-
in large part due to a dramatic increase over the last twenty-five years
in the use of CT scans and other x-rays. 60 Such exposure is not without
cost: the World Health Organization and other leading health
organizations have classified x-rays as carcinogens because studies
have shown that exposure can cause leukemia and cancers of the
thyroid, breast, and lung.16 Indeed, about 1.5 to 2% of all cancers in
the United States may be attributable to radiation from CT scans.162 To
take two other examples of the risks posed by medical monitoring, the
use of amniocentesis to detect birth defects can damage the fetus, while
colonoscopies used to test for colon cancer can result in perforation of
the colon.16 3 It is thus no surprise that clinical trials have shown that
"fewer individuals request medical monitoring once they observe ...
that monitoring is certainly not a costless procedure."
'' 64
Moreover, many medical monitoring regimes are simply
ineffective. The U.S. Preventative Services Task Force (the "Task
Force")-the leading independent panel of experts in preventative
care-has identified two principal requirements that must be satisfied
for medical monitoring to be considered effective:
First, "[t]he test must be able to detect the target condition
earlier than without screening and with sufficient accuracy
to avoid producing large numbers of false-positive and
false-negative results," and second, "screening for and
treating persons with early disease should improve the
likelihood of favorable health outcomes ... compared to
treating patients when they present with signs or symptoms
of the disease."
'' 65
With respect to the first requirement, some medical monitoring regimes
fail to detect disease in asymptomatic patients any earlier than would
otherwise occur. To take just one example, monitoring regimes have
failed to detect nephrotoxicity resulting from lead exposure prior to the
160 Roni C. Rabin, With Rise in Radiation Exposure, Experts Urge Caution on Tests,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at F5.
161 id.
162 David J. Brenner & Eric J. Hall, Computed Tomography-An Increasing Source of
Radiation Exposure, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2277, 2282 (Nov. 29, 2007).
163 Guzelian et al., supra note 157, at 70.
'64 Id. at 69-70.
165 U.S. Preventative Services Task Force, Guide to Clinical Preventative Sources
xxxi (2d ed. 1996) ("1996 Guide").
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onset of symptoms.' 66 Medical monitoring fails to provide any
benefit-and may do significant harm-in such cases.
In addition, many medical monitoring regimes result in large
numbers of false positives, i.e., "the test result indicates disease even
though the person is healthy." 167 And in what is known as the "cascade
effect," patients who incorrectly test positive for disease are then
subjected "to more invasive follow-up testing that may be
uncomfortable, expensive, and, in some cases, potentially harmful.'
168
For example, one study found that a screening exam for lung cancer
resulted in 20% of patients being incorrectly diagnosed with cancer.'
69
Those patients subsequently underwent thoracotomies only to learn that
they did not have cancer at all. 170 Another study showed that half of
chest radiographic exams that tested positive for cancer were found to
be inaccurate by subsequent spiral CT scans. 171 To make matters worse,
at least 90% of the spiral CT scans that resulted in diagnoses of cancer
turned out to be false positives. As a result, the patients were "exposed
not only to radiation, but also to anxiety and risks involved in having a
suspicious finding confirmed by invasive diagnostic procedures."'
172
Indeed, commentators have noted that in addition to the risks posed by
progressively invasive medical monitoring procedures, courts should
not "lightly dismiss the dread and anxiety that false positives will cause
for a statistically inevitable cohort of subjects and their families,
especially where cancer is concerned."' 173 Furthermore, the Task Force
has stated that "labeling" patients as sick may result in "altered
behavior and decreased work productivity."' 
74
The risk of false positives is particularly pronounced when
testing asymptomatic patients because very few individuals will
actually have the target disease in an asymptomatic population.175 The
Task Force provides the following illustration:
166 Schwartz et al., supra note 139, at 355.
167 Guzelian et al., supra note 157, at 69.
168 1996 Guide at xliv.
169 Takeshi Nawa et al., Lung cancer screening using low-dose spiral CT 'results of
baseline and one year follow up studies,' CHEST, July 2002; 122 (1:15-20).
170 id.
171 Valerie A. Palda & Harriette G.C. Van Spall, Screening for Lung Cancer: Updated
Recommendations from the Canadian Task Force on Preventative Health Care, at 7
(Aug. 2003).
172 Id. at 7-8.
173 McCarter, supra note 18, at 276-77.
174 1996 Guide at xliv.
175 Id.
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In a population of 100,000 in which the prevalence of a
cancer is 1%, there would be 1,000 persons with cancer and
99,000 without cancer. A screening test that yields 10%
false positives and 10% false negatives would detect 900 of
the 1,000 cases of the disease, but it would also mislabel
9,900 healthy persons as having cancer. The proportion of
persons with positive test results who actually had cancer-
the "positive predictive value" of the test-would be only
8.3%. 176
This risk of false positives compounds in the types of annual medical
monitoring regimes established by some courts, where every year's
tests bring with them a new chance for inaccurate diagnoses. 177 Thus,
medical monitoring of asymptomatic patients will in many cases result
in an unacceptably high number of false positives.
Medical monitoring also brings with it the risk of false
negatives, i.e., "the test result indicates the person is healthy even
though disease is present."1 78 For instance, some clinical trials have
shown that chest x-rays identify only 40% to 50% of lung cancers
present, meaning that at least half of the x-rays yielded false
negatives. 179 The Task Force has pointed out that patients who receive
test results that falsely indicate the absence of disease "might develop a
misplaced sense of security, resulting in inadequate attention to risk-
reducing behaviors and delays in seeking medical care when warning
symptoms become present."' 80 Patients who receive false negative
diagnoses are also "less likely to improve their health habits," a
problem that has led "many specialists in preventative medicine [to]
stress that behavior modification focusing on diet, exercise, and
substance abuse, is far more important for maintaining health than is
medical monitoring in asymptomatic individuals."'' 1 For example, the
Canadian Task Force on Preventative Health Care has stated that the
high rate of false negatives in screening for lung cancer has created "a
risk that the patient will be less motivated to quit smoking."' 182
Accordingly, patients generally should not undergo medical monitoring
regimes that result in significant numbers of false negatives.
176 Id.
177 Guzelian et al., supra note 157, at 81-82.
178 -d. at 69.
179 McCarter, supra note 18, at 136.
180 1996 Guide at xliii.
181 McCarter, supra note 18, at 277-78.
182 Palda & Van Spall, supra note 168, at 8.
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Even in cases where medical monitoring is both sufficiently
accurate and able to detect disease before symptoms appear, many
monitoring regimes fail to improve the patient's outcome. For instance,
the Task Force has declined to recommend screening for prostate
cancer because the evidence that screening improves patient outcomes
is too uncertain in light of the countervailing costs.1 83 Similarly, a
recent study of asymptomatic smokers found that although annual CT
scans increased the rate of lung cancer diagnoses, "[t]here was no
evidence that CT screening reduced the risk of death due to lung
cancer."1 84 The study theorized that the increase in diagnoses failed to
reduce the death rate because the annual CT scans detected cancers that
would not have grown sufficiently during the patient's lifetime to cause
any harm. 185 Yet the ten-fold increase in the number of thoracic
surgeries that resulted from the additional diagnoses may well have
caused harm because "the postoperative mortality rate following
resection of lung cancer in the United States averages 5%, and the
frequency of serious complications ranges from 20% to 44%. "186 These
types of studies have led the Task Force to decline to endorse lung
cancer screening for asymptomatic individuals.
187
Moreover, medical monitoring for some diseases-such as
Parkinson's Disease-is ineffective because there is currently no cure,
regardless of when the disease is detected. 88 The medical community
generally considers monitoring to be inappropriate in such cases
183 U.S. Preventative Services Task Force, Screening for Prostate Cancer: U.S.
Preventative Services Task Force Recommendation Statement, 149 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 185, 185-86 (Aug. 5, 2008).
184 Peter B. Bach et al., Computed Tomography Screening and Lung Cancer
Outcomes, 297 JAMA 953, 956 (Mar. 7, 2007).
185 Id. at 959.
186 id.
187 U.S. Preventative Services Task Force, Guide to Clinical Preventative Services 36
(3d ed. 2005); 1996 Guide at 135. A recent study provides some hope that screening
for lung cancer may be beneficial. Claudia I. Henschke et al., Survival of Patients
with Stage I Lung Cancer Detected on CT Screening, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1763
(Oct. 26, 2006). But the Henschke study has been met with heavy criticism because,
inter alia, it was based on survival rates (rather than mortality rates) and incorrectly
"assumed everyone with lung cancer would die of it without treatment." Gina Kolata,
Study Raises Doubts About Lung Cancer Screening, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at
A18. As a result, the Henschke study appears unlikely to change the position held by
leading medical organizations that the costs of screening for lung cancer outweigh its
benefits. Gina Kolata, Study Sees Gain on Lung Cancer, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2006,
at Al.
188 1996 Guide at xliv-xlvi.
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because "early detection can lead to great patient turmoil but cannot
lead to cure or treatment of the disease."'
8 9
In sum, medical monitoring is far from the unmitigated benefit
many believe it to be. To be sure, medical monitoring plays a useful
role in detecting some diseases in asymptomatic patients. But courts
must move beyond the conventional wisdom that medical monitoring is
always useful and take a more realistic view of the costs and benefits of
monitoring when deciding whether to adopt a medical monitoring claim
for asymptomatic plaintiffs.
C. The Public Policies Identified By Courts In Support
Of Medical Monitoring Claims Are Insufficient To
Justify Adoption Of The Claim.
Courts have offered four reasons in support of allowing
asymptomatic plaintiffs to recover medical monitoring. First, as the
California Supreme Court put it in Potter, "there is an important public
health interest in fostering access to medical testing for individuals
whose exposure to toxic chemicals creates an enhanced risk of disease,
particularly in light of the value of early diagnosis and treatment for
many cancer patients."'' 90 But most individuals do not need defendants
to "foster access to medical testing"-insurance provides access to any
necessary medical monitoring for about 85% of Americans.
19 1
Moreover, the interest in fostering access to medical monitoring rests
on the mistaken premise that monitoring provides an unmitigated
benefit to individuals who fear latent disease. In fact, as we discussed
above, "the stated policy concern of facilitating early detection and
treatment glosses over the uncertainty and debate in the medical
community regarding the availability and accuracy of testing to detect
the onset of disease."' 92 In any event, fostering access to medical
monitoring for the uninjured may detract from the overall "public
health interest" by limiting defendants' ability to compensate plaintiffs
with actual injuries that require treatment, increasing the time necessary
to obtain compensation for injured plaintiffs in the tort system, and
'89 Schwartz et al., supra note 139, at 354.
190 Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993).
191 U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States: 2007 at 19 (Aug. 2008).
192 John J. Weinholtz, Defending "No Injury... Yet" Medical Monitoring Claims in
Class Action Settings, 30-SPG Brief 17, 18-19 (2001).
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reducing the availability of medical resources and products helpful for
the treatment of the injured.
Second, Potter justified its adoption of a medical monitoring
remedy by stating that "'[t]he availability of a substantial remedy
before the consequences of the plaintiffs' exposure are manifest may
also have the beneficial effect of preventing or mitigating serious future
illnesses and thus reduce the overall costs to the responsible
parties."",193 This rationale's focus on fostering access to medical
monitoring in order to diagnose disease earlier than would otherwise
occur is similar to the first justification offered by Potter and is subject
to the same criticisms. 194 Moreover, in the unusual case where medical
monitoring would reduce the defendant's overall liability, a rational
defendant would voluntarily pay the costs of monitoring. A purported
concern for defendants' liability is no reason to impose a medical
monitoring claim by judicial fiat.
Third, Potter reasoned that "it would be inequitable for an
individual wrongfully exposed to dangerous toxins, but unable to prove
that cancer or disease is likely, to have to pay the expense of medical
monitoring when such intervention is clearly reasonable and
necessary."1 95 But as the reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
Products Liability noted in arguing that courts should reject medical
monitoring claims, Potter's assertion that "allowing medical
monitoring claims will provide compensation to plaintiffs who cannot
prove that they have been or are likely to be injured ... clearly begs the
question of why justice is necessarily served by allowing, through the
back door, recoveries that courts will not allow through in the front."
' 196
In jurisdictions that allow plaintiffs to recover lump sum damages this
rationale proves even less persuasive because there is good reason to
believe that many plaintiffs will not use their damages awards to obtain
medical monitoring. 197 For example, a commentator who interviewed
three of the plaintiffs in Ayers reported that one of the plaintiffs used
his damages award to buy a new home, while the other two "denied
193 863 P.2d at 824.
194 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 121, at 843 n.172.
'9' 863 P.2d at 824.
196 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 121, at 843.
197 Arvin Maskin et al., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserving
Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 521, 526 (2000) (assertion that it would be unfair for plaintiffs to pay for their
own medical monitoring "loses its initial intuitive appeal if many plaintiffs choose not
to seek medical attention in the wake of their exposure").
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seeing a physician more frequently as a result of the award."'
198
Similarly, the plaintiffs in a Utah medical monitoring lawsuit first
expressed concern about their exposure to asbestos in 1986 but had
submitted to only one preliminary examination by the time they filed
suit in 1993.199 And even in cases where "plaintiffs do indeed undergo
the diagnostic examinations they purport to seek, any money they
recover will be a true windfall for those whose health insurance already
covers such costs.
200
Finally, the district court in Carey justified its conclusion that
Illinois would adopt a medical monitoring remedy for asymptomatic
plaintiffs on its assertion that allowing plaintiffs to recover the costs of
medical monitoring "deters irresponsible discharge of toxic chemicals
by defendants. ' '2° 1 But as the Kentucky Supreme Court pointed out,
requiring defendants to compensate injured plaintiffs "should act as a
sufficient deterrent to those who would negligently produce and
distribute harmful substances., 20 2 Furthermore, the Carey court's
deterrence rationale "fails to consider the fact that in some instances the
practices that result in a plaintiffs claim for medical monitoring
damages, such as distribution or dumping of toxic substances that took
place years ago, were legal at the time they occurred, and, most
importantly, have already been terminated by the defendant."
20 3
In fact, providing a medical monitoring claim to the millions of
individuals who are at some unquantified increased risk of harm may
well result in "significant overdeterrence. 2 °4 The Illinois Supreme
Court has recognized that "the economic consequences of any single
accident are virtually limitless. 20 5 Therefore, "'[i]f defendants were
held liable for every economic effect of their negligence, they would
face virtually uninsurable risks far out of proportion to their culpability,
and far greater than is necessary to encourage potential tort defendants
to exercise care in their endeavors."' 20 6 To make matters worse, courts'
inability to offer a predictable standard for success in medical
monitoring cases "undoubtedly increases transaction and litigation
198 McCarter, supra note 18, at 257-58 n.158.
199 Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993).
200 Maskin et al., supra note 193, at 528.
201 Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (N.D. 111. 1998).
202 Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002).
203 Aberson, supra note 149, at 1118.
204 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 121, at 843.




costs. ' 207 Finally, the deterrence rationale "fails to adequately consider
whether a defendant's activity might be replacing more dangerous risks
than it has created., 20 8 In sum, Carey's assertion that medical
monitoring claims are necessary to deter wrongdoing is misguided
because the threat of lawsuits filed by plaintiffs with actual injuries
provides sufficient deterrence, and any deterrence added by medical
monitoring claims may well have the perverse effect of reducing the
manufacture of beneficial products.
V. THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS FAR BETTER
SUITED THAN THE JUDICIARY TO DEVISE AND
ADMINISTER A MEDICAL MONITORING CLAIM.
As we have explained, there are numerous reasons why the
Illinois Supreme Court should reject a medical monitoring claim for
asymptomatic plaintiffs. But even if adoption of such a claim were
warranted, courts are not well-suited to make that decision. The Illinois
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the legislature-not the
judiciary-should resolve public policy disputes that could result in a
sweeping expansion of the common law. 209 In rejecting the market
share liability theory, for example, the court reasoned that "this change
is most appropriate for the legislature to develop, with its added ability
to hold hearings and determine public policy. '210 Similarly, in refusing
to adopt an "expansion of the common law" to allow plaintiffs to sue
the firearms industry for expenditures incurred due to gun violence, the
court explained that "[a]ny change of this magnitude in the law
affecting a highly regulated industry must be the work of the
legislature, brought about by the political process, not the work of the
courts., 211 Although the plaintiffs' bar has complained that such rulings
constitute an abandonment of the court's "responsibility to declare the
207 Klein, supra note 106, at 26-27.
208 Id. at 27.
209 E.g., Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (I11. 1999) ("the General
Assembly, which speaks through the passage of legislation, occupies a superior
position in determining public policy"); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672
N.E.2d 1178, 1192 (Ill. 1996) ('"the court is not designed or equipped to make public
policy decisions'); Gordon v. Dep't of Transp., 457 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ill. 1983) ("It
is the legislature's task to codify public policy; we refrain from undertaking such
impermissible judicial legislation.").
210 Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 342 (Ill. 1990).
211 City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099,1148 (Ill. 2004).
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common law," the court has rightly responded by "point[ing] to the
virtue of judicial restraint.212
As the Michigan Supreme Court recognized in Henry, there are
three principal reasons why legislatures are better suited than courts to
resolve complex public policy disputes. First, "'information-
gathering' by courts "'is limited to one set of facts in each lawsuit,
which is shaped and limited by arguments from opposing counsel who
seek to advance purely private interests.' 213 By contrast, legislatures
"'can gather facts from a wide range of sources to help lawmakers
decide whether the law should be changed and, if so, what sorts of
changes should be made."'2 14 The Illinois Supreme Court has
recognized the same point, stating that the legislature "has a superior
ability to gather and synthesize data" because "[i]t is free to solicit
information and advice from the many public and private organizations
that may be impacted., 215 Courts, on the other hand, are "ill-equipped"
to resolve complex public policy disputes because they "can consider
only one case at a time and are constrained by the facts before
[them]. ''216
Second, "'legislatures make law prospectively, which gives the
public fair notice about significant legal changes.' 2 1 7 Courts, on the
other hand, "'make law retroactively. This creates notice and fairness
problems.' ' 218 Third, legislatures "'must be sensitive to the will of the
public' to an extent far greater than even elected judges, and "'if far-
reaching public policy decisions are to be made, the public should have
the opportunity to evaluate those changes and express their agreement
or disagreement in the voting booth."' 219 As the Illinois Supreme Court
explained, "'[i]f their legislators pass laws with which they disagree or
refuse to act when the people think they should, they can make their
dissatisfaction known at the polls. They can write to their
representatives or appear before them and let their protests be heard.'
22 0
A court, on the other hand, "is not so easy to reach[,] nor is it so easy to
persuade that its judgment ought to be revised. A legislature may not be
212 id.
213 701 N.W.2d at 699 n.24.
214 id.
215 Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Il. 1995).
216id.
217 Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 699 n.24 (Mich. 2005).
2181d
2191d.
220 Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1192 (Ill. 1996).
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a hard horse to harness, but it is not quite the stubborn mule that a court
can be.'
' 22 1
To be sure, courts have properly weighed public policy in
expanding the common law. But as a number of courts have
recognized, medical monitoring is different. 222 To begin with, and as
our discussion thus far suggests, courts must weigh a host of public
policy issues in resolving the threshold question whether to recognize a
medical monitoring claim. It is no exaggeration to say that lawsuits
seeking the adoption of medical monitoring claims ask courts to
overturn centuries of tort law by abandoning the physical injury
223requirement. In doing so, plaintiffs ask courts to foresee what other
legal doctrines-e.g., rules governing standing, the accrual of statutes
of limitations, the bar on claim splitting, the economic loss rule, claims
for increased risk of future harm-may unravel in the process. In
addition, lawsuits seeking the recognition of medical monitoring claims
ask courts to make a complex cost-benefit analysis. Courts must decide,
for instance, whether the benefits of providing medical monitoring to
uninjured plaintiffs outweigh the costs to, among other things, future
plaintiffs who incur actual injuries, the judiciary's ability to process
more important cases, the availability of beneficial products at
accessible prices, and the economy as a whole.
Furthermore, most courts that have adopted medical monitoring
claims have expressed a preference that relief be provided in the form
221 Id.
222 Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 699 n.24; Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849,
858 (Ky. 2002); Badillo v. Am. Brands, 16 P.3d 435, 440 (Nev. 2001) ("Altering
common law rights, creating new causes of action, and providing new remedies for
wrongs is generally a legislative, not a judicial, function."); Carroll v. Litton Sys.,
Inc., 1990 WL 312969, at *87 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (recognition of a medical monitoring
claim "implicates policy issues that should be left to the legislature in the first
instance"); see also Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 435 (W.Va.
1999) (Maynard, J., dissenting) (recognition of a medical monitoring claim usurps the
legislature's right to create causes of action); David C. Campbell, Comment, Medical
Monitoring: The Viability of a New Cause of Action in Oregon, 82 OR. L. REV. 529,
546-47 (2003) ("[T]he creation of a medical monitoring tort by the Oregon courts is
not appropriate. Instead, this decision should be left to the wisdom of the legislature,
which can carefully balance the need for a new cause of action against the potential
flood of litigation the tort will likely initiate.").
223 E.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 121, at 841-42 ("From the beginnings of
our negligence jurisprudence, 'injury' has been synonymous with 'harm,' and
connotes physical impairment or dysfunction, or mental upset, pain and suffering
resulting from such harm."); Schwartz et al., supra note 102, at 1059 ("For over two
hundred years, one of the fundamental principles of tort law has been that a plaintiff
cannot recover without proof of a physical injury.").
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of court-supervised programs rather than lump sum damages. 214 Those
courts have reasoned that many plaintiffs will use lump sum damages
for purposes other than visits to the doctor, thereby negating one of the
principal purposes behind medical monitoring claims-to diagnose and
treat disease. Although clearly preferable to lump sum damages, court-
supervised programs require judges to make an endless series of
medical decisions based on little more than the experts proffered by the
parties. As we discussed above, plaintiffs typically allege an increased
risk of contracting numerous different diseases and demand a wide
array of medical monitoring regimes to detect those diseases, leaving it
to the court to sort out which of the requested exams is medically
necessary. The court therefore must "assess the accuracy of each
proposed monitoring [regime] to determine whether it is reliable,"
which in turn requires "an analysis of prevalence (i.e., the proportion of
the population with the suspect condition) and the proposed test's
scientific sensitivity, specificity, and predictive value." 225 Without such
an assessment, the court could not "discern risks inherent in the testing
procedure, such as the incidence of false positives and false
negatives." 226 The court also must decide whether each proposed
monitoring regime would detect each feared disease before the onset of
symptoms and, if so, whether the early diagnosis would make a
difference in the plaintiffs medical outcome.2 27 To make matters more
difficult, decisions about the proper monitoring regime may depend on
factors peculiar to each plaintiff-e.g., age, gender, individual risk
factors-and initial decisions may require reconsideration as new
228exams and diseases emerge. 8 Finally, the court must establish: (a) a
"trigger" to determine eligibility for the program; (b) the frequency of
229the monitoring; and (c) the duration of the program. In short, the
construction of a medical monitoring program would require courts to
"dictate medical guidelines," a task to which judges are "hardly
suited., 23
0
224 E.g., Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 750 So.2d, 103, 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999); Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Ayers
v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 313-14 (N.J. 1987).
225 Schwartz et al., supra note 102, at 1073.
226 id.
227 1996 Guide at xliii.
228 Myrton F. Beeler & Robert Sappenfield, Medical Monitoring: What is It, How Can
It Be Improved?, 87:2 AM. J. OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 287 (1987).
229 Schwartz et al., supra note 102, at 1076.
230 Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 539 (8th Cir. 1988).
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In addition to requiring courts to resolve difficult scientific
questions, medical monitoring claims also call for courts to make a
series of more mundane-but no less important-decisions about the
monitoring program's administration. Henry cited the following
questions that courts devising medical monitoring programs would
have to resolve:
How would claims be filed? How would claims be
processed? Who would do the processing-court staff or a
private contract firm? Would a claimant be free to receive
testing from any medical facility he chooses, or would a
claimant's choice of testing facility be limited? To keep
down costs of the program, could defendant be permitted to
establish a "preferred provider network" of medical
professionals such that claimants could only be tested
within the network? In the absence of such a network,
would claimants be limited to the usual and necessary costs
for such services, or is the sky the limit? How would the
system reconcile two different physicians' opinions of what
is "reasonable" in terms of medical testing? Would there be
a grievance procedure? Would defendant be billed directly,
or would it periodically pay into a fund?
23
'
Courts would also have to resolve a host of additional questions, e.g.,
whether the collateral source rule enables plaintiffs to participate in a
monitoring program even though insurance provides the same
monitoring for free and whether money not spent by the monitoring
program would revert to the defendant.
Courts simply do not "possess the technical expertise necessary
to effectively administer a program heavily dependent on scientific
disciplines such as medicine, chemistry, and environmental science.
The burdens of such a system would more appropriately be borne by an
administrative agency specifically created and empowered to
administer such a program., 232 And as one commentator noted, "if the
only proper way to allocate damages in this situation is through an
agency-like process, one should consider whether it might not be more
sensible to use an agency in the first place. 233
23' Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 699 n.23 (Mich. 2005).23 2 Id. at 699.
233 Klein, supra note 106, at 32 n.149.
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Conclusion
Since the beginning of American law, courts have required
plaintiffs to prove a physical injury to recover in tort. The physical
injury requirement has provided a bright line rule that distinguishes
among cases that warrant judicial resources and minimizes the risk of
fraudulent claims. Over the last twenty years, however, the plaintiffs'
bar has relied upon society's fear of latent disease to convince a
number of courts-including some in Illinois-that the benefits
provided by medical monitoring are sufficient to overcome the physical
injury requirement. But abandoning the physical injury requirement
may have troubling consequences for other legal doctrines, such as
rules governing standing, the accrual of statutes of limitations, the bar
on claim splitting, the economic loss rule, and claims for increased risk
of future harm. Moreover, there are a host of public policy
considerations that weigh against the adoption of a medical monitoring
claim for uninjured plaintiffs. A claim for medical monitoring would
make virtually everyone a potential plaintiff. The expansion of the
plaintiff pool would in turn result in a reduction in defendants' ability
to compensate the injured, further congestion in the courts, the
expenditure of scarce medical resources, limitations on the accessibility
of beneficial products, and harm to the economy as a whole. Nor is
there any pressing need to adopt a medical monitoring claim for
asymptomatic plaintiffs. Although medical monitoring is useful in
some cases, the medical community has cast significant doubt on many
monitoring regimes, and insurance provides any medically necessary
monitoring for the vast majority of Americans. Finally, even if
adoption of a medical monitoring claim were warranted, the
legislature-not the judiciary-is best-suited to make that far-reaching
decision and to implement such an unwieldy claim.
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